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I. INTRODUCTION
A personal sanctuary impervious to unreasonable governmental in-
trusion is guaranteed every citizen by the Bill of Rights.' With the excep-
tion of first amendment freedoms, the broad contours of this sphere of
liberty have evolved primarily in the context of criminal procedure. Fourth
amendment rules of "search and seizure,"2 fifth amendment guidelines
for police-suspect confrontations,8 and the right to representation by
competent counsel' have become fundamental to state and federal crim-
inal process. Underlying these procedural prescriptions is a fundamental
"right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people."'
While the influence of the privacy doctrine on criminal procedure
has been far-reaching,6 its inroad into substantive criminal law is prov-
ing even more decisive, engendering a constitutional challenge to laws
punishing "crimes of morality." Outside the context of procedural due
process, however, the right of privacy has never been expressly defined
in terms sufficient to permit any reasonable prediction as to what activi-
* Member of the Florida Bar; member of the firm of McCarthy, Steel, Hector and
Davis.
** B.A. 1963, Wellesley College.
1. The Poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown.
It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm may
enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter ...
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959) (quoting William Pitt).
2. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). Even before the turn of the century, it was
recognized that the fourth and the fifth amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of
the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
6. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT.
REV. 212.
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ties will be protected by its constitutional shield.7 The possible philosophi-
cal assumptions which underly the right have been only sparsely theorized,
and the basis for measuring the appropriate balance between the indi-
vidual's right of privacy and the right of government to intrude upon that
privacy remains unstated. Through the integration of old philosophies
and new judicial decisions, this missing dialogue may be synthesized, and
the resulting privacy doctrines may be applicable to some of our most
publicized social phenomena.
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVACY
The moral laws which denominate sin and immorality reach into the
very soul of the individual, judging and punishing a man's inner thoughts
and emotions as well as his deeds.8 Moral laws, historically intertwined
with religion-which in Western culture embodies an omniscient and om-
nipotent deity-so totally encompass the individual that their reconcilia-
tion with individual privacy is conceptually impossible. The moral code
governs the most private of acts and the most public of deeds.
Because the state is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, a realm of
individual conduct can be put beyond the state's knowledge and power.
Thus, the concept of privacy arises from the proposition that the reach
of civil and criminal laws should not be co-extensive with moral laws;
rather, there should be a realm of individual thought and action-a zone
of privacy-beyond the law. 9
Sinful and immoral conduct, such as murder, rape, or theft, may
inflict immediate physical, psychological or economic injury. On the other
hand, sinful conduct may produce no discernible damage, as may be the
case with blasphemous thoughts, the possession of obscene material, or
an occasional incident of sodomy with one's wife. The philosophical con-
troversy over the right of privacy centers on whether specific conduct
does produce discernible injuries, and if not, whether such conduct may
nonetheless incur criminal penalties because of its sinful or immoral
7. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MIcH. L. Rzv. 259
(1965); Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra; Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy? 64 MIcH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
In the law of torts, the right of privacy was first formulated by Brandeis and Warren,
The Right to Privacy, 4 H~Av. L. REv. 193 (1890).
8. "You shall not kill . . . commit adultery . . . steal . .. "; "You shall not covet your
neighbor's house; you shall not covet your neighbor's wife, or his manservant, or his maid-
servant, or his ox, or his ass, or anything that is your neighbor's." Exodus 20:13-15, 17.
9. "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen." Emerson, Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Micia. L. REV. 219, 229 (1965). The connection between
law and morals, however, has often been discussed without any reference to individual pri-
vacy. Compare Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 H~av. L. REv.
593 (1958) with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
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character. Birth control,1" sodomy,1' homosexual activity,1 2 possession of
peyote,1 3 possession of marijuana,14 possession of LSD, and possession of
pornographic materials 6 are all arguably "crimes of morality," which
have engendered much litigation and literary comment.
Views as to the proper connection between law and morals are typi-
cally allocated into two primary divisions: the "moralists," represented by
Sir Patrick Arthur Devlin, and the "Utilitarians," represented by Jeremy
Bentham.17 This division, while valid for many purposes, actually ob-
scures more than it illuminates; for, as will be seen, with respect to limita-
tions on the right of government to control the individual, Devlin and
Bentham simply state the same principle in different terms.
Believing that Christian morals are an integral part of the social
community, Lord Devlin argues that "morality is necessary to society"
and must be supported by "the use of those instruments without which
morality cannot be maintained." These instruments include teaching,
which is doctrine, and "enforcement, which is law.""' The morality pre-
servable by community law is akin to public sentiment. For example, con-
cerning homosexual activity, Devlin concludes:
We should ask ourselves in the first instance whether, looking at
it calmly and dispassionately, we regard it as a vice so abomina-
ble that its mere presence is an offense. If that is the genuine
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943); Comment, Connecticut's Birth Control Law: Reviewing a State Statute Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 70 YALE L.J. 322 (1960). For a refreshing sense of humor in this
connection see also Note, Man, His Dog and Birth Control: A Study in Comparative Rights,
70 YALE L.J. 1205 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Hollis, Criminal Law-Sexual Offences-Sodomy-Cunnilingus, 8 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 531 (1968); Johnsen, Sodomy Statutes-A Need for Change, 13 S.D.L. REv.
384 (1968); Note, Sodomy-Crime or Sin?, 12 U. Fra. L. REV. 83 (1959).
12. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965). This case also learnedly
discusses the privacy of a public toilet stall.
13. State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966); Note, Constitutional Law:
Use of Peyote as a Free Exercise of Religion, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 377 (1966).
14. Eckroth v. Florida, 227 So.2d 313, 314 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), rev'd, 238 So.2d 75
(Fla. 1970), deciding whether a person
who receives from another, a pipe of marijuana belonging to that other person for
the mere purpose of taking a drag or puff therefrom and then returning said pipe
via passing it on around the circle isguilty of unlawful "possession or control" of a
narcotic drug.
15. Rosborough, LSD: A Challenge to American Drug Law Philosophy, 19 U. FiA. L.
REV. 311 (1966).16. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960), rev'd on other grounds,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. The philosophies of Devlin and Bentham are explored at length, with emphasis on
the contrast of their views as opposed to the similarities of the views, in Comment, Morals
and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962).
18. P. DEvLi, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 25 (Ist ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as
Devlin]. Cf. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAmB. L.J. 174, 197, in which it is
said: "Men often say one cannot legislate morality. I should say that we legislate hardly
anything else."
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feeling of the society in which we live, I do not see how society
can be denied the right to eradicate it.19
The enforcement of morals is, in Devlin's terms, little more than the
use of law to provide "psychic fulfillment" to the community body. If
homosexual conduct, like a bad odor, is psychologically revolting, the
community may apply its most fearsome sanctions to cleanse the irritant.
The principle that criminal laws may and should enforce community
morality so as to maximize the psychic pleasures of the community body
reduces into merely a sub-theorem of Bentham's utilitarian principle that
"all human action is to be scrutinized against the criterion of its tendency
to produce pleasure or pain and judged by the final balance in the
pleasure-pain ledger . . ." The laws of government are to be based on
a single communal judgment: "That which is conformable to the utility,
or the interest of the community, is what tends to augment the total sum
of the happiness of the individuals that compose it."21 The enforcement
of moral laws based on Devlin's community psyche is within this utility
principle, because to Bentham pleasure includes emotional enrichment,
such as the psychic satisfaction of "doing good" or maintaining commu-
nity respect, and emotional deprivation, such as that resulting from the
social revulsion triggered by immoral conduct. This conjuncture of Ben-
tham's utilitarian and Devlin's morality principles reflects their common
premise that the aggregate psyche or sense of the community determines
how far laws may reach into the life of the individual. Bentham's utility
principle is simply broader in outlook, extending beyond morality into a
range of human choice only minimally associated with ethical and moral
considerations. Bentham's sense of the community governs all social ac-
tions-determining the varieties of bread men may eat as well as the
persons with whom they sleep.
Contrasted with the Devlin-Bentham resort to a community con-
sensus is the view that criminal laws must be predicated not only on
whether conduct is moral or immoral, beneficial or injurious, but also on
whom an incident affects. Activities affecting only willful and intelligent
participants are beyond the perimeter of government control, but when
they affect others, society may evaluate and then prohibit those activities
found injurious. In this sense, the "harm to others" principle establishes
a zone of privacy in which an individual's thoughts and deeds are con-
trolled by his conscience alone.'s
19. DEVLIm at 18. A well reasoned critique of Devlin's use of "morality" suggests that:
[T]he principles of democracy we follow do not call for the enforcement of con-
sensus, for the belief that prejudices, personal aversions and rationalizations do
not justify restricting another's freedom itself occupies a critical and fundamental
position in our popular morality.
Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YAIE L.J. 986, 1001 (1966).
20. Comment, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962).
21. J. BENTHAm, THEORY OP LEGISLATiON 2 (Hildreth ed. 1876).
22. An extended analysis of the harm to others principle can be found in Comment,
Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforce-
ment of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 581 (1967).
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The principle that individuals have a sphere of action limitable only
when other members of society receive injury is attributed to John
Stuart Mill who wrote:
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised
over any member of a civilized community against his will is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise or even right."
In modern times, Mill's philosophy has been referred to in the debate
over legislation proposed in England24 and the United States.25 For ex-
ample, the famous 1957 Wolfenden Report, concerning homosexual of-
fenses and prostitution, observes that the function of law
[I]s to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen
from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient
safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others ...
It is not ... the function of law to intervene in the private lives
of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of be-
havior. 2 6
The report concludes:
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting
through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with
that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and
immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business.2"
Neither Mill nor the Wolfenden Report advocates that laws totally
avoid enforcing morality. Mill's philosophy merely suggests a zone of
privacy where individuals may conduct themselves according to their own
intelligent judgment as long as they do not adversely affect others who
may not approve of the conduct for themselves. Privacy in this context
refers to conduct which is closely and intimately related to the individual
and his consenting associates, as opposed to privacy in the sense of con-
cealment from others. This distinction is often overlooked, in that some
23. J. MILL, ON LraBERT (1859), published in 25 HARVARD CLAssics 203-04 (1961).
24. COMMTr E ON HOMOSEXUAL OPFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT, CM . No. 247
(1957) [hereinafter cited as WOLPENDEN REPORT].
25. In 1955, the Reporters of the American Law Institute recommended that "all sexual
practices not involving force, adult corruption of minors, or public offense" should be ex-
cluded from criminal proscription. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, comment at 277 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). The recommendation was based on the grounds, among others, that,
No harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in a typical sex
practice in private between consenting adult partners. This area of private morals
is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities.
26. WoLENDEN REPORT at 9-10.
27. Id. at 24.
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conduct, such as homosexual love-making, may be considered injurious
to others when open to public view. 8
If injury to others determines what conduct falls within the zone of
privacy, then the borders of this zone will depend on the factual and
value judgments society makes regarding the effect of individual con-
duct. 9 For crimes like murder and theft, the judgments involved are sim-
ple when contrasted with crimes premised on more remote and indirect
consequences of individual human behavior. On the other hand the judg-
ments can become more difficult. For example, may unmarried adults be
prohibited from having sexual relations because the resulting illegitimate
births will burden society? Or may unmarried men be barred from simul-
taneously living with more than one woman because such cohabitation is
an attractive alternative to marriage and invites divorce?
Mill and the Wolfenden Report obviously contemplate an immediate
and direct injury to non-consenting persons as a prerequisite to criminal
sanctions. If, however, as in the two hypotheticals, illegitimate births oc-
cur and marriages dissolve, both at the expense of the public purse, society
should not be impotent to prohibit the cause of the injury. Such impo-
tency would seem justified only if injury is unestablished or insignificant.
Perhaps, then, Mill and the Wolfenden Report state a legitimate philos-
ophy, the practical thrust of which is simply to require clear proof of a
significant injury before criminal sanctions are imposed. When a criminal
law is based on a remote or indirect injury to society, the classical pre-
sumption that laws are predicated on sufficient legislative facts" should
not control.
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: GRISWOLD AND PRODIGY
For the promotion of public morals, a Connecticut statute of Civil
War vintage banned the use of contraceptives. 1 In declaring this pro-
28. As to distasteful public conduct, even Mill concedes,
[Tlhere are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves,
ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation
of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offenses against others,
may rightly be prohibited.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), quoted in TuE UTILITARIANS (1961).
29. The injury required as a prerequisite to criminal sanctions has been defined as
"the negation, endangering, or destruction of an individual, group, or state interest which
was deemed socially valuable, in harmony with the Constitution," Eser, The Principle of
"Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal
Interests, 4 DuQuEsNE U.L. REV. 345, 413 (1966).
30. "If under any possible state of facts a statute would be constitutional, 'the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was passed must be assumed.' Rast v. Van Deman
& L. Co., 240 U.S. 342, 60 L. Ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370[(1916) ]." 16 Am. JUR. 2d Constitu-
tional Law § 143, at 343 n.19 (1964).
31. [T]he primary objective of the Connecticut statute, as far as could be determined,
was to promote public morality by prohibiting the use of extrinsic devises to prevent
conception, even within the marital relation. The enactment was, in other words,
designed to compel adherence to a purely moral principle.
Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcm. L. Rzv, 219, 225 (1965).
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hibition unconstitutional, Griswold v. Connecticut" gave birth to the pen-
umbral rights of privacy and repose. The decision in Griswold reasons
that the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have "penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help to give them life and
substance."3 The Court further elucidated the doctrine of penumbral
rights by stating:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of asso-
ciation contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that pri-
vacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of
the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citi-
zen to create his own privacy which governments may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment pro-
vides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.134
This zone of privacy would seem to be the inner world of private
morality and immorality portrayed by Mill and the Wolfenden Report;
a world into which government may not intrude unless the outside com-
munity suffers injury. But while the opinion of the Griswold Court meticu-
lously sets forth the inductive process through which the right of privacy
is inferred, the contents and scope of this right are virtually undefined.
The marital relationship between man and woman is placed "within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guar-
antees,"35 but there is neither an enumeration of other rights falling
within the zone nor the suggestion of criteria for determining inclusion
of other rights within this constitutionally protected area.
Also notable is the failure of the Court in Griswold to describe the
interplay between the zone of privacy and statutes which infringe upon
it. There are four tests which could have determined the justification for
Connecticut's intrusion into the marital bedroom. First, the zone of privacy
may classify rights which are "absolute" and not subject to infringement."
Second, under a balancing test, the protected relationship or activities
may have outweighed the interest Connecticut sought to promote through
its legislation." Third, while the interest of the state may have been
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. Id. at 484.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 485.
36. The absolute right test is formulated generally in a first amendment context. See
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment as an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
37. A balancing test was first employed with respect to free speech in American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950). For comment supporting the test,
1971]
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compelling, the invalidated statute bore no rational relationship to this
interest.3 Finally, even if the statute did bear a rational relationship to
the activity sought to be controlled, this end could have been achieved by
a less restrictive alternative, one which did not sacrifice rights within the
protected zone.3
9
The concurring opinion by Justice Goldberg suggests that while the
right of privacy is less than absolute, it may not be abridged "simply on
a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the
effectuation of a proper state purpose." 40 Rejecting the "absolute right"
and "mere rational connection" formulae, Justice Goldberg reasons that
Connecticut should have evidenced a compelling interest in subordinating
individual liberty, but failed to do so.4 ' The interest it did establish could
"be served by a more discriminately tailored statute" which did not sweep
unnecessarily broadly and intrude upon the privacy of married couples.'
In determining the boundaries of protection, Justice Goldberg states
that the necessary inquiry is whether the right involved is of such a char-
acter that it cannot be abridged without violating those "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions. 43 In false prophecy, the right of privacy is then
defined in terms of what it is not. The right of privacy in no way inter-
feres with a state's "proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or miscon-
duct." "Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which
the state forbids," but the intimacy of husband and wife "is necessarily
an essential and an accepted feature of the institution of marriage," an
institution which the state "always and in every age has fostered.""
see Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75; for a
criticism of the test, see Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self Preservation Against Political
Freedom, 49 CAi". L. REV. 4 (1961) and Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
38. This test has generally been applied under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment when a legislative classification is challenged as being without rational
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Generally the "constitutional safe-
guard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the State's objective." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
39. [E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liber-
ties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridge-
ment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964). See Struve, The Less-Restrictive-
Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1463 (1967); Comment,
Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
40. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 498.
43. Id. at 493. For the suggestion that Griswold merely restates the protection afforded
"fundamental rights" under the fourteenth amendment see Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,
Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L.
REV. 235 (1965). Kauper concludes that "far from advancing to a new milepost on the high
road to judicial supremacy," Griswold "was treading a worn and familiar path." Id. at 258.
44. Id. at 498-99. Petitioner's counsel apparently was a far more accurate prophet. Ob-
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Notwithstanding the suggestion that only sexual relationships ap-
proved by the state are within the zone of protection, Griswold has
spawned significant decisions which appear to have judicially enacted the
Wolfenden Report recommendations as to sexual conduct by consenting
adults in private. In Cotner v. Henry,4" wherein a husband had been con-
victed of committing sodomy with his wife, the court declares that the
"import of the Griswold decision is that private, consensual, marital rela-
tions are protected from regulation by the state through the use of a
criminal penalty."46 The right of privacy is thus extended to socially dis-
approved as well as approved intimacies in the marital bedroom. Fur-
ther, in People v. Roberts,47 the right of privacy is extended beyond
the marital bedroom, and homosexual relations between consenting male
adults in private, including sodomy, are placed beyond state criminal
sanctions.
In each of these extensions of Griswold, the critical factor was the
state's failure to clearly demonstrate an overriding interest in preventing
the relations it condemned. The significance of the Cotner and Roberts
decisions could not be fully amplified, however, until their rationale was
applied in a case where the state sought to demonstrate a substantial
public interest underlying its criminal statute, thereby forcing the court
to gauge the actual "weight" of the right of privacy when balanced
against other interests.
People v. Belous48 applies the right of privacy to still another con-
text. A medical doctor had been convicted of abortion and conspiracy to
commit an abortion. The young woman whose pregnancy was aborted
was unmarried at the time. Without hesitation, the court concludes that
a woman's right to life and to choose whether to bear children "follows
from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledgment of a
'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family and
sex." '49 The decisive question, therefore, was "not whether such rights
exist, but whether the state has a compelling interest in the regulation
of a subject which is within the police powers of the state. ' ° The statute
serving that "constitutional doctrines have a way of expanding beyond the boundaries of
the original case," he predicted that the right of privacy would be applied to sexual conduct
outside the marital relation, abortion laws, and electronic eavesdropping. Emerson, Nine Jus-
tices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219 (1965).
45. 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 875; accord, Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alaska 1969), wherein it is
volunteered that if
the case at bar concerned private, consensual conduct with no visible impact upon
other persons, at least some of us might perceive a right to privacy claim as one of
the penumbral emanations of the Bill of Rights.
47. 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967); see also Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
48. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
49. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
50. Id. at 964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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was invalidated because it could not be construed in a manner that re-
flected a sufficiently compelling state interest.
While the right in Belous to prevent birth after conception might be
the natural corollary of the right in Griswold to prevent birth before con-
ception, the zone of privacy is substantial if it includes the right to ex-
punge the consequences of illegal sexual activity notwithstanding the
strong interest society has heretofore shown in unborn children. Belous
does not shirk the judicial burden of balancing the competing interests
of society and the individual. On the contrary, the opinion interpolated an
immense volume of historical and sociological data.
The decisional process required in Belous inevitably precipitates a
major criticism of the right of privacy. If conscienciously represented,
a state will introduce a mass of factual data supporting the "injuries" its
criminal laws seek to prevent. The judicial forum, handicapped by limi-
tations of time, personnel, and rules of procedure, is hardly an ideal
forum to sift evidence and determine the factual basis for any statute.51
For this very reason, courts have traditionally presumed the validity of
the legislative facts on which legislation is predicated.52
However, legal and constitutional rights never exist in a vacuum.
Legislative findings of fact can determine the existence of a valid state
"interest" warranting the subordination of individual interests. If ac-
cepted without scrutiny by the judiciary, legislative findings of fact can
turn basic rights into mere shadows. If courts are to protect individual
liberties from state encroachment, whether in the area of civil rights or
personal rights, they must independently evaluate data with reference
to the society in which they function.53 The resources of the state are
greater than that of the individual, and the evil resulting from the in-
fringement of a personal liberty is obvious. It is, therefore, fundamentally
fair that the state bear the burden of proving conclusively that the in-
fringement imposed is required by a compelling interest which cannot be
safeguarded by less restrictive procedures.
Reasserting the doctrine of privacy in the context of first amend-
ment freedoms, Stanley v. GeorgiaM formulates significant guidelines for
justifying society's intrusion into the privacy of the individual. Stanley
had been convicted under a Georgia statute prohibiting the mere posses-
51. With respect to balancing competing interests, "the factual determinations involved
are enormously difficult and time consuming, and quite unsuitable for the judicial process."
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 913 (1963).
One commentator concludes that the Supreme Court has implicitly conceded "it is not quali-
fied to choose between various means" when applying a less restrictive alternative test. Com-
ment, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 474 (1969). Cf.
C. MITIR, Tim SuPREmE CoUrT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 17-20 (1969), which notes the
Supreme Court's increasing use of "social evidence."
52. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
53. For the view that the Supreme Court should take evidence in the form of "legisla-
tive facts", see Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75.
54. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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sion of obscene material found in his bedroom desk. In a setting of
"a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the
privacy of a person's own home," the Court says the right to receive
information and ideas "takes on an added dimension, for also fundamental
is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from un-
wanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. '
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the support of happiness. They recognized the sig-
nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feeling and of his intel-
lect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued of civilized man. 6
Confronted by these "traditional notions of individual liberty,"
Georgia launched a three-pronged defense of its statute. First, the State
asserted the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of
obscenity.5" This asserted right was found to be wholly inconsistent with
the philosophy of the first amendment, which precludes government from
controlling "the moral content of a person's thoughts."58 The freedom to
be moral or immoral, then, short of actual deeds, is a liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution.
As a second defense, Georgia asserted that exposure to obscenity may
lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of violence. The Court doubted
the empirical basis of this assertion and, more importantly, concluded
that a state
may no more prohibit mere possession of obscenity on the
ground that it may lead to anti-social conduct than it may pro-
hibit the possession of chemistry books on the ground that they
may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.59
Instead, a "clear and present danger of anti-social conduct"' must be
shown. This quantum of proof may apply more to the first amendment
right to receive information than to the zone of individual liberty ac-
knowledged by the Court, but the required showing is an equally appro-
priate safeguard against the unnecessary infringement of any of the
personal liberties assumed under the "right of privacy." The state should,
as a minimum, prove that the possession of any prohibited material
"would probably induce its recipients to" anti-social conduct.
55. Id. at 564.
56. Id. (quoting from Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 567,
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Finally, Georgia maintained that prohibiting possession of obscenity
is a necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting distribution.
Again, the Court doubted the factual basis of the assertion but stated
that, even if true, the need to "ease the administration of otherwise valid
criminal laws" was deemed an insufficient reason for dispensing with fun-
damental liberties.61
By acknowledging a right of privacy that applies to substantive law
as well as criminal procedure, Griswold and its prodigy have fortified a
sphere of individual liberty against governmental intrusion, unless the
intrusion is based on a clear showing of a "compelling interest" that can-
not be accomplished with "less restrictive" laws. More than the mere
assertion that anti-social conduct may result is required. The timeworn
claims of difficulties in enforcing other laws or of safeguarding an in-
dividual against some purely moral depravity carry little weight, and a
mere "rational connection" between a law and social welfare will not jus-
tify infringement of protected liberties.
While neither the full content nor specific criteria for determining
inclusion within the zone of privacy has been disclosed, Griswold and
prodigy follow closely the precepts of Mill and the Wolfenden Report
that power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized
community against his will only to prevent harm to others. When in-
dividual thought or action does not discernibly injure others, it is to be
left unfettered.
As a limitation on the power of criminal laws to regulate an indi-
vidual's private affairs, the right of privacy is in its infancy. Its growth
into maturity can only be predicted by decisions which are currently too
scarce to allow particularization concerning future development. Poten-
tially, however, the privacy doctrine can structure a dramatic departure
from the present relationships between the individual and his govern-
ment, legitimizing and expanding a new world of personal freedom. Some
of the more probable expansions, as well as limitations, of the doctrine
are explored next.
IV. THE BRAVE NEW WORLD
The frontier relationships between man and government necessarily
evolve with the society in which they both co-exist. As sexual permissive-
ness (some would say license) expands, the friction generated in this
area by hostile contacts between man and government will decline
simply because the number of contacts will decrease. But new frictions
will arise, and in some instances, the old frictions will accelerate in the
frenzy of their dissolution.
61. Id. at 568. While Stanley prevents prosecution of a private individual for possession
of obscene material in his home, its protection does not extend to possession of obscene ma-
terials by a vendor. Mitchum v. State, 251 So.2d 298, 302 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing, United
States v. Thirty Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) and United States v. Ridel 402 U.S.
351 (1971).
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Searching for an identity that is uniquely theirs, or perhaps merely
reaching out for new experiences, some Americans, attempting to assert
a new life-style, ask if they may wear their hair long, 2 use hallucinogenics,
such as marijuana," and, possibly, live in a communal group.6 4 While
such questions might appear more appropriately directed to their parental
or peer groups, the law, nonetheless, has increasingly become their final
arbiter.
The right of privacy derives significance as a constitutional doctrine
because of a continuing relevance to individual freedom in creating a life-
style. Long hair, hallucinogenics, communal relationships, and the choices
they involve illustrate this relevancy. These phenomena are not selected
because of their particular immediacy to vital social issues but, rather,
because they contain ingredients important to the doctrinal development
of privacy.
A. The Long Hair Decisions 5
The right of privacy has long been treated as almost the right of
concealment. In tort law, privacy has involved the individual's right to
keep information about himself and his family from becoming public
knowledge. 66 In criminal procedure, the fourth and fifth amendments
have concerned the individual's right to withhold information and evi-
dence from agents of the government.6" Even when applied to substantive
criminal laws, the elements of privacy and concealment have been the
primary characterization. Images of a closed-door doctrine are conjured
62. [H]airstyles have altered from time to time throughout the ages. Samson's
locks symbolically signified his virility. Many of the Founding Fathers of this coun-
try wore wigs. President Lincoln grew a beard at the suggestion of a juvenile
female admirer. Chief Justice Hughes' beard furnished the model for the frieze
over the portico of the Supreme Court of the United States proclaiming 'equal jus-
tice under law'. Today many of both the younger and older generations have
avoided the increased cost of barbering by allowing their locks or burnsides to
grow to greater lengths than when a haircut cost a quarter of a dollar.
Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 451 (D. Mass. 1969).
63. There "are 500,000 to 1,000,000 'regular' marijuana smokers in the United States
and 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 'occasional' users." See J. SIMoNs (ED.), MARIJUANA: MYTHS
AND REALrrIEs 232 (1967)." Cited in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
64. See notes 102 and 109 inira.
65. There is a real and growing violence in the society about these seemingly
innocent and personal matters of costume . . . [The] greatest internal conflict in
America in the late 1960's [will be between] the people with long hair and the
people with short hair.
Wakefield, The War in Home, 224 ATLANTIC, October, 1969, at 119, 120. The earliest "long
hair" decision on record can be found in Samson v. Delilah, Judges 16:4-28; this case con-
tains an excellent discussion of the consequences of a haircut.
66. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), noted 81 H~Av. L. REv. 169 (1967);
cf. Note, The Right to be Let Alone, 18 U. FIA. L. REV. 597 (1965).
67. One commentator declares:
[T]he right to privacy now means nothing more than a diminishing protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment, combined with
the protection against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, furnishes only
modest protection of the right to privacy.
Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SvP. CT. REV
212, 251.
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by the repeated references to the marital bedroom in Griswold. This back-
ground raises the inevitable question: is there a right of privacy
in a public context?
The right of privacy is formulated from the premise that laws can
prohibit only that individual conduct which is injurious to others. Based
on this premise, the right of privacy should protect all non-injurious
activity, whether private or public. Of course, some activities are crim-
inally punishable only in a public context;"' drunken and disorderly con-
duct, public defecation, and marital intercourse are examples. But, gauged
by current mores, these activities are considered injurious to others merely
by the fact of exposure.
The recent revolution in men's hair styles has interjected the right
of privacy into a public context. A typical incident is described in Ferrell
v. Dallas Independent School District,"9 where members of a musical
combo were denied admittance to a public high school because of their
"Beatle style" haircuts. This "no admission with long hair rule" was
promulgated because the short hair students showed their dislike for long
hair by threatening to cut it, using obscene language, and on occasion,
initiating fights. In ensuing litigation, various courts have recognized
that whether "hair styles be regarded as evidence of conformity or of
individuality, they are one of the most visable examples of personality; 7
their regulation without "a compelling subordinating interest" would "as-
sault personality and individuality."71 Notwithstanding the fact that one's
hair style is necessarily exposed to public view, courts have therefore
placed a student's hairstyle within his right of privacy, and concluded that
"until one's appearance carries with it a substantive risk of harm to
others, it should be dictated by one's own taste or lack of it."7 2
In Ferrell, however, the "no admission with long hair rule" was
sustained on the basis that it was fairly calculated to prevent the dis-
orders resulting from the short hair students' adverse reaction to long
hair. Whatever the merits of the Ferrell decision, this basis for the
opinion is surprising. If, as the circuit court acknowledges,73 the long hair
dissenters were exercising a constitutional right, then this right was cur-
68. Many sexual offenses have historically been predicated on public exposure. Com-
ment, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: A Crime and Its Enforcement, 70 YALE
L.J. 623 (1961). For an entertaining discussion of another aspect of the public exposure
concept, see also Schmerer, The Law of Organized Nudism, 17 U. MAMI L. REv. 596 (1963).
69. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
70. Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 451 (D. Mass. 1969).
71. Breen v. Cahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 706 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
72. Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots might insist that every male have
a crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But [this contradicts] the ideas of
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," expressed . . . in the Constitution it-
self, including of course freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy.
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (Justice Douglas,
dissenting).
73. 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
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tailed because of the likelihood of improper or disorderly action by those
who support the status quo. This rule of adverse reaction has been clearly
rejected in Terminiello v. Chicago, where the right to speak unpopular
views was upheld even if it "stirred people to anger, invited public dis-
pute, or brought about a condition of unrest,"74 and in United States v.
U.S. Kans, where the "threat of mob violence" was no excuse for the
failure of the court to issue an injunction "to protect the constitutional
rights of private citizens.
'75
Even the clear and present danger doctrine76 affords no support for a
rule of adverse reaction. If a man yells "fire" in a crowded theater, or in-
cites an aroused and angry mob to violence, the ensuing disorder is a re-
flex response, as the time and circumstances do not permit calm and dispas-
sionate analysis. The disorder is presumed to be the natural and intended
consequence of his words; the injury is to others. This is hardly analogous
to an individual expressing his unpopular views or his unorthodox life-
style in circumstances that are typical to everyday life. Those who react
adversely to the individual are not exercising a reflex response that he can
be presumed to have intended. The resulting injury is primarily to him.
Those who deliberately and improperly engage in such suppression are
responsible for the disorder and it is they, not the dissenter, who should
be disciplined.
The adverse reaction in Ferrell is also distinguishable from the ad-
verse reaction that justifies laws punishing disorderly conduct or public
sex acts. In Ferrell, the exposure to long hair did not, in itself, injure the
short hair students. Only when the short hair students reacted, by starting
fights or using obscene language, did disorder result, destroying a suitable
classroom atmosphere. To transmogrify language from the law of torts,
the short hair students were an "intervening cause" between the long hair
and the ultimate injury; they had the "last clear chance" to prevent dis-
order. In the case of disorderly conduct or lewd and lascivious behavior,
the exposure itself to other members of society is the injury. Those who
witness such an incident receive the injury. The witnesses do not injure
others as was the case in Ferrell.
The long hair decisions are important not only because they expose a
failure on the part of school officials to justify the infringement of indi-
vidual freedoms that they have so long imposed at will. In addition, the
cases emphasize that young people are entitled to share some of the
liberties shielded by every man's right of privacy. As Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District observes:
74. 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
75. 194 F. Supp. 897, 906 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
76. The clear and present danger test was originally formulated by Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), which concerned the limits of free speech.
The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
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In our system, state operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism . . . Students in school as well as out of school
are "persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the state must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the state.77
B. Splendor in the Grass
In affirming the right to possess obscene materials in the privacy
of the home, Stanley v. Georgia78 reminds us that the makers of our Con-
stitution "undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of hap-
piness" and to protect Americans in "their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations." Happiness, thoughts, emotions, and sen-
sations are experienced by some as much through marijuana and peyote
as through pornographic pictures. If the Constitution protects the pos-
session of one, does it protect possession of them all?
A footnote to the Stanley decision79 disavows any intent to diminish
the general power of government to make possession of others items,
"such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime." Instead, the hold-
ing is said to turn upon the Georgia statute's "infringement of funda-
mental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
Expressly noted is the fact that no "First Amendment rights are involved
in most statutes making mere possession criminal." This caveat could
mean that first amendment rights take precedence over all other consti-
tutional rights so that the decision is only applicable in a first amend-
ment context. But if this narrow holding was intended, the reference to
"fundamental liberties" and the fourteenth amendment would seem out
of place. Moreover, the precedence given the first amendment rights would
contradict the Court's express recognition that "also fundamental is the
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted gov-
ernmental intrusions into one's privacy" and that the Constitution confers
"as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."' 0 Clearly,
after suggesting the fundamental importance of the right of privacy, it
would be incongruous for the Court to exclude this liberty from the de-
cision's umbrella.
If Stanley must be interpreted as incorporating the right of privacy,
then its caveat means simply that, notwithstanding any general right of
possession, "compelling reasons . . . exist for overriding the right of the
individual to possess"'" narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods. The decision
that compelling reasons exist with respect to these items is of little con-
77. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
78. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
79. Id. at 551 n.11. Followed in Borras v. State, 229 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1969).
80. Id. at 549.
81. Id. at 551 n.11.
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sequence, compared to the far more important fact that Stanley sets forth
clear guidelines for determining, first, when the state may render "mere
private possession" a crime and, second, that these guidelines may apply
to the possession of non-narcotics, such as marijuana.
By upholding the right of the state to criminally punish the mere
possession of marijuana, Commonwealth v. Leis 2 is totally at odds with
the Stanley guidelines. In determining the evils that justified Massachu-
setts' action, the court in Leis reasons that the "smoking of marijuana
may cause a state of euphoria and hallucinations or mental confusion and
acute panic." In one percent to ten percent of the population, marijuana
might trigger short-term "psychotic breaks" which do not, however,
"cause permanent psychotic injury or mental deterioration" or induce
violent or other destructive behavior.8" These "evils" involve nothing less
than the very core of an individual's mind-his inner feelings, sensations
and thoughts. But a free people should be entitled to induce brief and
fleeting moments of "euphoria" or even "confusion," "panic," and "hal-
lucinations" through sex, obscene materials, or even legal writings. As
Stanley proclaims loud and clear: "The makers of our Constitution under-
took ... to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. 84 In short, the state "cannot constitutionally
premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's" mind. 5
As a second justification for its decision, the Leis court reasons that
there "is considerable evidence that marihuana does lead some people to
the use of more dangerous drugs."8" If taken literally, this conclusion is a
logical non sequiter to what the court expressly acknowledges the evidence
to be. As the court explains:
Essentially the experts do not point to any evidence of a direct,
causal relationship between the smoking of marihuana and the
use of more dangerous drugs. The studies that do exist discount
the once prevalent belief that the smoking of marihuana inevita-
bly leads to the use of more dangerous drugs.
s7
What the court apparently means is that statistics show that of those who
use dangerous drugs, some (approximately one-fifth) will have also used
marijuana." In this sense, the statement that marijuana "leads to" dan-
gerous drug use does not imply that marijuana "induces" or "causes"
82. 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969) ; accord, Raines v. State, 225 So.2d 330 (Fla.
1969) (parties stipulated that all transcribed evidence in Leis would be admitted in
record).
83. 355 Mass. 189, 193, 243 N.E.2d 898, 902 (1969).
84. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (quoting from Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
85. Id. at 566.
86. Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 194, 243 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1969).
87. Id. at 194, 243 N.E.2d at 902-03.
88. Id. at 194 n.11, 243 N.E.2d at 903 n.11. See Ball, Chambers, & Ball, The Association
of Marihuana Smoking with Opiate Addiction in the United States, 59 J. Cuma&. L.C. & P.S.
171 (1968).
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such drug use. On this basis, Leis contradicts the clear mandate in Stanley
that the state may not prohibit "mere possession" on the ground that "it
may lead to antisocial conduct" but must demonstrate that the prohibited
possession would "create a clear and present danger of anti-social conduct
or would probably induce its recipients to such conduct."89
Finally, the reasoning in Leis justifies the prohibition on the basis that
smoking marijuana "causes automobile accidents." This conclusion, the
court concedes, has never been empirically demonstrated because "there
is no accurate, reliable scientific means of determining whether the op-
erator of a motor vehicle has recently smoked marihuana." 90 Instead, the
conclusion is deduced from an asserted "agreement among the experts"
that marijuana "causes an alteration of sensory perception, a degree of
psychomotor discoordination and an inability to concentrate," and that all
of these effects of marijuana would interfere with the safe operation of
a motor vehicle." While this "agreement among the experts" is highly
doubtful, more important is the fact left unstated: unlike alcohol, which
induces an exaggerated sense of competency and skill, marijuana induces
a euphoric, otherworld feeling that causes its subjects not to undertake
activities, such as driving, which require substantial control over real
life objects. 2 Because of the passiveness it induces, marijuana is unlikely
to be associated with driving and consequent highway accidents. In any
event, Stanley clearly suggests that an infringement of a constitutional
right must be justified by more than unsubstantiated theories as to pos-
sible anti-social conduct.
Even when sheltered by the right of privacy, some activities should
be subject to state regulation on the showing of an interest less compelling
than that required for others. Different activities have different degrees
of importance. The right to possess cosmetics, for example, should require
a less compelling interest than the right to possess birth control pills. On
this basis, the right of privacy should be viewed as a presumption. An
activity will be presumed not to injure other members of the community
so as to justify its prohibition by the state if the activity is "personal" in
nature and common experience reveals no direct and immediately per-
ceivable effect on others. The strength of this presumption varies with
the activity claiming the shield of privacy.
Viewing privacy as a presumption the strength of which varies with
the activity it shelters, the Leis court could well have reasoned that the
possession of fifty pounds of marijuana at a public airport in Boston is
not very "personal" and, because of the quantities involved, is more likely
to affect others. Also unlike sex or literature, marijuana lacks any history
of use that would elevate its importance. The right of privacy would thus
89. 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969).
90. 355 Mass. 189, 194, 243 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1969).
91. Id.'
92. Weii, Zinberg, & Nelsen, Clinical and Psychological Effects of Marihuana in Man,
162 SCIECE 1.234 (1968).
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afford a weak presumption to be balanced against the showing of a com-
pelling interest of the state. Without explaining why, however, the court
simply determines that marijuana is "not within" a "zone of privacy,"
and that there is "no right, fundamental or otherwise, to become intoxi-
cated by means of the smoking of marijuana." If activities are to be ex-
cluded by judicial intuition or fiat, explanation may be unnecessary, but
an apparently arbitrary result will inescapably accompany the lack of co-
herent criteria for classifying conduct within or without the radius of
constitutional protection.
Whether expressed in the language of presumption or of a balancing
of interest, some would argue that courts will abdicate their responsibili-
ties to the legislature rather than symbolically weigh a mass of factual
and policy ponderables.93 The case of People v. Woody, 4 however, il-
lustrates that individual and public interests can and will be balanced
when the possession of marijuana and peyote is constitutionally protected.
Notwithstanding the limitations stated in the Stanley case, Woody ap-
proved the assertion of a first amendment right to possess and use peyote
by members of the Native American Church, a religious body composed
principally of Navajo Indians who "experienced their religion" through
peyote consumption. Woody rejects the "state's chronicle of harmful con-
sequences," which included a possible correlation between the use of
peyote and more harmful drugs as well as an alleged influence on small
children. Also repudiated by the court was the power to prohibit an
activity because the state "in its asserted omniscience" determines that
it "obstructs enlightenment and shackles the Indian to primitive condi-
tions."95 The handicap to "rigorous enforcement of the [state's] narcotics
laws" was conceded if possession by the Navajos was permitted; how-
ever, when weighed against free religious expression, this handicap
was not found sufficiently compelling.96 Irrespective of the conclusions
reached, Woody is important as a reflection of the judicial willingness
and capacity to evaluate the data essential to the state's justification for
infringing a first amendment right to possess peyote. The same pattern of
analysis can be utilized when the "symbolic scale of constitutionality"
weighs not freedom of religion, but the right of privacy.
Supporting antecedents to the right of private possession are found
in an earlier epoch of our nation's history when the power to outlaw
the possession and personal use of intoxicating liquors was challenged.97
These "alcohol cases" were argued under the "privileges and immunities"
clause of the fourteenth amendment which protects only those "privileges
93. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
913 (1963).
94. 61 Cal. 2d 889, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
95. Id. at 894, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
96. Id. at 897, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
97. Ex parte Francis, 76 Fla. 304, 79 So. 753 (1918); Ex parte Brown, 38 Tex. Crim.
295, 42 S.W. 554 (1897); State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 10 S.E. 283 (1889).
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and immunities" that are "in their nature fundamental" and "belong of
right to the citizens of all free governments.""8 Intoxicating liquors are
property and property rights are fundamental, so the "alcohol cases"
concluded that possession and use could be prohibited only to promote
public health, safety, and morals. Accordingly, the prohibition was de-
clared an unjustified abridgement of the privileges and immunities of a
citizen, because "the keeping of liquors in his possession by a person,
whether for himself or for another . . . can by no possibility injure or
affect the health, morals, or safety of the public."99 While two decades
later, Crane v. Campbell10 sustained the right to criminally punish the
mere possession of whisky for personal use, it did so to ease "the diffi-
culties always attendant upon [enforcing other laws to] suppress traffic
in liquors, ' 1°1 a rationale whose current validity is emphatically rejected
by Stanley.
C. All in the Family
The traditions, economics, politics, and religious beliefs of America
have as their common predicate the monogamous family. A sudden con-
version of the family prototype to a polygamous unit would require dras-
tic revision of every detail of the nation's life-style. The type of automo-
biles we drive and the homes we build, our dining arrangements, dating
patterns, the allocation of work, and the multi-numerous facets of every-
day life would all be radically altered.
While the adaption of a monogamous family to a polygamous cul-
ture is an imaginary occurrence, the converse is a realty. Thousands of
American citizens, for reasons of religion or conscience, have chosen an
unorthodox family unit, the communal family. Living in plural house-
holds are over 30,000 men, women, and children" 2 of Fundamentalist
Mormon faith, 0 3 whose polygamous relationships subject them to pun-
ishment under national l0 4 and state laws'0 5 and excommunication from
the Mother Church. 6 For less than purely religious reasons, but in an
98. State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 147, 10 S.E. 283, 284 (1889).
99. Id.
100. 245 U.S. 304 (1917).
101. Id. at 307.
102. William M. Rogers, former Special Assistant to State Attorney General, Utah,
reported in Husbands With More Than One Wife, LADDns Hosas J., June, 1967, at 78.
103. Fundamentalist Mormons "not only believe in polygamy; unlike other Mormons,
they practice it." Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 16 (1946).
104. See note 111 infra.
105. 10 Am. JuR. 2d Bigamy § 2 (1962).
106. In 1890, the President of the Church issued what has been popularly known as
the "Manifesto," which renounced the doctrine of bigamy and polygamy. The Manifesto
was accepted by the United States Government and was a precondition to the government's
proclamation of amnesty and pardon to all Mormons who practiced polygamy prior to
November 1, 1890. See Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621, 654, 96 P. 26, 37 (1908). With re-
spect to the Manifesto, an anonymous Church Elder has remarked: "We believe the mani-
festo was inspired not by revelation but by political and economic expediency .... If it is
living God's law or the law of the land, we will live God's law. Polygamy remains a pillar
of our faith." Husbands With More than One Wife, supra note 102, at 78.
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attempt to get closer to God, nature, and the true man, many "flower
children" have also formed communal settlements, 10 departing from not
only the materialistic society of their parents and peers, but also the
equally false atmosphere of the Haight-Ashburys. 08 There are an esti-
mated 500 such communes across the country, with an aggregate popula-
tion of 10,000.109 Included in their ranks are not only press-publicized
"trippers," but also some highly educated and family-oriented citizens,
such as engineers, architects, carpenters, teachers, social workers, auto
mechanics, and even policemen. They are all seeking a simpler way of
life, emphasizing pride in work done together." 0
At first blush, the right of privacy would appear to have no applica-
tion to polygamous and communal families. While the privacy doctrine
has been applied to individual acts, such as the acts of possession and
"illicit" intercourse, it has never been applied to a series of ongoing rela-
tionships such as would characterize a "family" grouping. Nonetheless,
stemming from the doctrine's roots in the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, the privacy doctrine has a high degree of relevancy as a limitation
upon the government's power to punish immorality per se.
Federal anti-polygamy legislation culminated in 1892 with the pas-
sage of the Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Law."' The Law punished not only
107. The commune movement is neither a uniquely American nor a recent phenomenon.
For a description of communes in Germany and Scandinavia, see A Berlin Commune is a
Big Happy Family (Sometimes), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 52 et seq.,
and From Sweden and Denmark: Experiments in Marriage, LIFE, Aug. 15, 1969, at 38.
Establishment of the Brooks Farm Commune in 1841 is discussed in Thoreau and Hecker:
Freeman, Friends, Mystics, CATHOLIC WORLD, Sept., 1969, at 265. For a basic history of the
"flower children," see "The Hippies," HORIZON, Spring, 1968, at 2.
108. Getting Away From It All Down on the Hog Farm, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1968,
at 16. They "are like people all over the country who are leaving the boiling cauldron of the
big city and seeking the space and freedom that is promised in the American dream." Trouble
in Paradise, RAmPARTS, November 1969, at 23.
[These] youthful pioneers, unlike the earlier Americans who went into the wilder-
ness to seek their fortunes, are refugees from affluence. . . . They seek in the land,
and in one another, meaningful work, mutual love, and spiritual rebirth.
The Commune Comes to America, LIrE, July 18, 1969, at 16B.
109. Years of the Commune, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1969, at 89.
[In the] last five years since the first hippie settlements sprang up in California, the
commune movement has spread-first to the Southwest and within the past year,
to the colder and more puritanical climates of the Northeast. Houriet, Life and
Death of a Commune Called Oz, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1969 § 6 (Magazine), at 31.
"They live in crashpads, teepees, geodesic domes, and $100,000 converted guest ranches."
Year of the Commune, supra, at 89.
110. Trouble in Paradise, RAMPARTS, Nov., 1969, at 24. This article is an impassioned
account of the harassment inflicted on a commune named "Canyon." One incident is worth
repeating:
Canyon residents awoke one morning recently to find . . . twelve deputy sheriffs
fully armed and helmeted, three narcotics agents, a dog catcher with a tranquilizer
gun, and three buildings inspectors . . . trespassing on their land and entering their
homes looking for "illegal structures" and other [building] violations. When they
had finished their mission, they had "posted" twenty structures (including a ware-
house, a barn, a tree house for children, a chicken coop and a "sculpture").
Id. at 27. Cf. Hippie-Busting by the Narcotics Squad, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1968,
at 19.
111. Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 [hereinafter cited as Edmunds Anti.
Polygamy Law]. A small portion of this Act is incorporated in 48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
bigamy," 2 but also cohabitation with more than one woman." 3 The
first of the ensuing polygamy cases, Murphy v. Ramsey," 4 involved sec-
tion 8 of the Act, which bars polygamists from voting in territorial elec-
tions. The decision turned on the antiquated theory that the
personal and civil rights of the inhabitants of the Territories are
secured to them, as to other citizens, by the principles of con-
stitutional liberty which restrain all the agencies of govern-
ment . . . [but] their political rights are franchises which they
hold as privileges in the legislative discretion of the Congress
of the United States." 5
Indeed, says the Court, it "would be quite competent for the sovereign
power to declare that no one but a married person shall be entitled to
vote.""' 6 However, the day has long passed since the Supreme Court has
placed the right to vote at the discretion of Congress," and Murphy,
therefore, is without contemporary application.
Murphy also determined, however, that even if there were limita-
tions on congressional discretion, they would not preclude action designed
to prepare a territory for entry into the Union. In such a case, "no legis-
lation can be supposed more wholesome" for a territory than that which
seeks to establish "the idea of the family as consisting in and springing
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy state of
matrimony." The wholesome quality attained by such legislation is a
"reverent morality, which is the source of all beneficent progress in social
and political improvements."""
This intuitively-felt connection between the morality of monogamy
and the social good may have been beyond doubt in the 1880's but it is
of questioned validity today."9 A state cannot, for example, deny wel-
fare payments to a family whose mother is cohabiting with a man
who is not her husband.' Similarly, a state cannot prohibit an unmar-
112. Id. at § 1.
113. Id. at § 3.
114. 114 U.S. 47 (1884).
115. Id. at 57.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), holding that "if discrimination is
sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by
the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights." See also id. at 247 (Justice Douglas,
concurring), "right to vote in both federal and state elections was protected by the judiciary
long before the right received the explicit protection it is now accorded by" federal laws.
118. 114 U.S. 47, 57-58 (1884).
119. In classifying the interstate transportation of Mormon wives as immoral under the
Mann Act, Cleveland v. United States, 324 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1946), recently resurrected the
language of the Mormon cases. In dissent, Justice Murphy articulately expresses the view that
the Mann Act was hardly intended to punish a man who transports a woman who, by the
practices of an established church, is his wife. Id. at 25-29. Whatever its merits, however,
Cleveland v. United States is limited to the statutory interpretation of the phrase "immoral
purpose," and does not reconsider the constitutional issues raised by the Mormon cases.
120. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). The majority did not reach the constitutional
issue, as they concluded, "Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy should
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tied woman from recovering for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
children.' 2 ' Both limitations recognize that the state's interest in punish-
ing sin and immorality, even to preserve the idea of "one man and one
woman in the holy state of matrimony," is not superior to the individual's
right to equal protection of the laws. Under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, sin and immorality are not per se legitimate
bases for governmental retribution. 122 When these equal protection deci-
sions are coupled with Griswold, which has been construed to condone
intercourse without marriage, and Stanley, which requires laws to be predi-
cated on more than moral injury to the individual and the possibility of
injury to society, Murphy's suggestion that laws may punish polygamy
on moral grounds alone seems highly tenuous."'2
There are circumstances, of course, when deviations from monogamy
should trigger criminal sanctions. A man with one wife should not marry
a second woman who, through deception, believes he is single. Nor should
a second marriage be allowed over the objection of the first wife. Here
the basis for criminal punishment is the fraud perpetrated on the second
wife or the alteration of the marital relationship without the consent of
be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that punish dependent
children." Id. at 325. But see note 123 infra.
121. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Louisiana's laws
were said to be "based on morals and general welfare because it discourages bringing children
into the world out of wedlock." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69 (1968) (a companion
case). The Court found "no possible rational basis .. . for assuming that if the natural
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of
illegitimacy will be served." Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., supra at 75. Without
this benefit to the general welfare, the law was based on sin alone, a classification which
was an invidious discrimination.
122. Concurring in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1969), Justice Douglas maintains
that the state's action violated the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. In
his words:
[The welfare] regulations are aimed at punishing mothers who have nonmarital
sexual relations. The economic need of the children, their age, their other means of
support, are all irrelevant. The standard is the so-called immorality of the
mother. . . .The other day in a comparable situation we held the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred discrimination against illegitimate chil-
dren. We held that they cannot be denied a cause of action because they were
conceived in "sin," that the making of such a disqualification was an invidious dis-
crimination. Levy v. Louisiana.. . .I would think precisely the same result should
be reached here. I would say that the immorality of the mother has no rational
connection with the need of her children under any welfare program.
123. A communal family, whether a hippie settlement or a Mormon household, is not a
casual act that can easily escape public notice. To some, the "establishment or maintenance
of polygamous households is a notorious example of promiscuity, a public disturbance and
an annoyance." Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946). If the law can punish
a man who is drunk on the street, can it not punish such a house of "immorality?" A man
can be drunk at home or in his club, and he can drink more moderately in other public
places; prohibiting drunkness on a public street is a small limitation when there are reasonable
alternatives. A communal family can either live together-or it can dissolve. There are no
alternatives. The disorder a drunk on the street causes is generally viewed as immediately
disturbing by way of his sounds or presence. A polygamous household is disturbing in the
sense that, as a concept, members of our society cannot tolerate it. Our country values
toleration. There is, therefore, no real comparison between laws that take drunks off our
streets and those which banish the communal family from our country.
1971]
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the first wife, not the immorality of polygamy. If children are demon-
strably neglected or a family impoverished because of polygamy, this
too could be a rational basis for prohibiting the practice. Theoretically,
however, this same prohibition would be applicable to a monogamous
relationship, where child neglect and poverty also exist.'24
Any defense of the communal family based on the right of privacy,
even when plausible first amendment rights are asserted, might appear
foredoomed because of the unanimous condemnation of polygamy by the
Supreme Court.2 5 In Reynolds v. United States,"2 for example, a Mor-
mon asserted first amendment protection for the exercise of his religious
beliefs, which sanctioned bigamy. The free exercise clause of the first
amendment was held to protect his religious beliefs but not his actions.
This belief-action dichotomy, however, is clearly diminished by the deci-
sion in Sherbert v. Verner,"27 which requires state regulation of "conduct
or actions" prompted by religious principles to be "justified by a 'com-
pelling state interest.'" This is the same standard now applied to the right
of privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
The greatest misfortunes befalling the right of privacy as a consti-
tutional doctrine are its name and birth. The right of privacy is not one
right but many rights, some of which have nothing to do with conceal-
ment from public view. The right of privacy is the right of the individual
to exist and act in accordance with his own conscience, free from govern-
mental interference so long as he does not harm others.
The privacy doctrine was spawned in a decision involving the marital
124. Child neglect and abuse is such a part of monogamous America that most states
have regulated the problem by statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 828.04 and 828.042 (1969).
As to the problems of poverty, see the daily edition of any major newspaper.
125. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Church of Christ of L.D.S. v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 637 (1889); Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 47 (1884) ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 244 (1878).
126. 98 U.S. 244 (1878).
127. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). Apparently realizing a conflict with Reynolds and the
other Mormon cases, Sherbert characterizes them as involving conduct which "posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." This characterization is entirely spurious
because nowhere do the Mormon cases cite public safety and order as their premise. More
importantly, this characterization fails to specifically include a threat to public morals, which
was the primary ground on which the Mormon decisions rested. This omission is probably
not an oversight. It may signal the Supreme Court's unwillingness to accept a threat to
public morals per se as a justification for state regulation of religiously motivated conduct.
See also Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80
HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1403 (1967), for the view that:
The state is only engaging in its basic functions when it protects life by the law of
homicide and property by the law of theft. But when it seeks to protect the
aspirational aspects of morality, i.e., those precepts and values designed to improve
the quality of the individual's life and to elevate the tone of interpersonal relation-
ships, problems arise. This kind of morality is analogous to religion.
Laws enforcing this type of "morality" may violate the establishment clause of the first
amendment.
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bedroom where the metaphor of privacy in the sense of closed curtains
and drawn blinds was mistaken for the doctrine itself. The irony of this
misfortune is highlighted by Richards v. Thurston, where the court, con-
fronted with the right of high school students to wear long hair, reasons
that: "[W]e do [not] see the logic of expanding the right of marital.
privacy identified in Griswold v. Connecticut... into a right to go public
as one pleases."12 Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the court explicitly
recognizes the real right of privacy in concluding that the Constitution
"establishes a sphere of personal liberty for every individual, subject to
reasonable intrusions by the state in furtherance of legitimate state
interests."' 2 9
Although described as existing only under the penumbra of the Bill
of Rights, the right of privacy is potentially the most important of all
our rights. It is the right of every person to be himself and to perform
the myriad of daily acts that make up his own identity; the right to wear
long hair, use harmless hallucinogenics, to freely choose one's sexual part-
ners, to have or not have children. The assertion of these and similar
rights, by whatever label they are designated, is a declaration of the in-
dividual's being, which is inevitable in an era so vitally concerned with
the quality of life.
128. 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970).
129. Id. at 1284.
